Originally written for Quantitative Research Methods at the University of Leeds, taught by Dr. Lisa Buckner
Abstract:
It has been reported that fertility rates are in decline, with recent years hitting record lows since the Great Depression. Still, the Coronavirus pandemic has brought the possibility of a mini “baby boom”. This report will seek to compile and analyse secondary data that could provide context to the recent fertility trends, and predict potential policy changes. This data analysis will be supplemented with pertinent academic literature, exploring the ways environmental, societal, and personal factors might impact parents’ decisions to have children.
Research Problem and Questions:
The Office for National Statistics (2020a) found that live births in 2019 were down 2.5% from 2018, which is a 12.2% decrease since their last peak in 2012. This is the only most recent portion of a downward trend that started in 1964, when the fertility rate was 2.93. The trend stabilized soon after the Abortion Act in 1968, and has remained between a fertility rate of 1.6 and 2 since 1973, 2019 saw a fertility rate of 1.65. This is the lowest it’s been since 2001 (1.63) and 2002 (1.64), and only the third time it’s dropped below 1.66 since 1977. Fertility rates are down across the population generally, but “fertility rates for women in age groups under 30 years were at the lowest level since records began in 1938” (Office for National Statistics, 2020a), meaning women are waiting longer before having children, and having fewer overall. This downward trend has been of some concern to economists: “low fertility will indeed challenge government programs and very low fertility undermines living standards, we find that moderately low fertility and population decline favor the broader material standard of living” (Lee et al, 2015). However, this trend can potentially be explained by a variety of environmental, societal, and personal factors, and, with enough foresite, be managed to ensure the government and society as a whole isn’t left without care.
On the other hand, there is evidence for the potential for a mini baby boom following the Coronavirus pandemic. Rises in fertility rates tend to happen in times of economic prosperity, as well as during times of social change, notably the post-World War II “Baby Boomer” generation (Van Bavel and Reher, 2013), however there have been a number of examples of mini baby booms, including following environmental disasters (Ice Babies, 1998; Anonymous, 2007). As such, there has been discussion as to whether or not there will be a pandemic baby boom. Some theorise that the implementation of stay-at-home measures will make a “boredom” baby boom: “The enforced proximity brought by the quarantine measures, for example, might push birth rates up in the next year” (The Economist, 2020), however, others have reported a short term dip in fertility rates nine months after a deadly epidemic, with them returning to normal 18 months later (McBain et al, 2016).
This report seeks to observe to what extent major events have impacted fertility rates in the past and explore the ways in which societal conditions relating to childrearing have changed over time. Policy implications will be discussed throughout. First, the methodological approach will be presented, exploring the benefits and limitations of secondary data analysis. Second, relevant statistics such as fertility rates during previous major events will be used to assess the potential of a Covid-19 mini baby boom. Further, cost of living over time and the possible deterrent working parents face will be analysed and brought into conversation, with regards to the academic theory on the issues to address concerns of a mini baby boom and the policy implications therein. Third, the report will summarise the important conclusions about changing fertility rates.
Methodology:
This report will draw on secondary data analysis, which has been widely used in academia as well as governmental bodies, as a more efficient method of research (Johnston, 2014). Rather than researchers having to go out and create their own data sets, one can draw on high quality and wide-reaching data that has been collected by trustworthy organisations such as governmental bodies. Using data which already exists could also be considered to be a more ethical approach since research subjects are not being asked to give up their time and energy more than is absolutely necessary. So too, it means data that has already been collected is able to become subject to multiple levels or types of analysis, and a variety of research questions, ensuring every piece of data that is collected makes the most impact possible (Bryman, 2016). This is particularly important when it comes to researching topics like fertility and parenting, which can contain sensitive topics to the research subjects, and which has an impact on multiple generations at a time.
However, there are some drawbacks to secondary data analysis in comparison to collecting primary data. Because the current researcher does not have a hand in collecting the data, there might be questions in which they are interested which the data cannot answer. So too, researchers using secondary data have a lack of control over how the data was collected, what levels of response rate they might be dealing with, if there are any populations that have been missed, or any instances of participants misunderstanding questions and therefore creating faulty data. These difficulties only increase when using data which has already been analysed, rather than doing secondary statistical analysis on raw datasets (Johnston, 2014; Neuman, 2003). As long as a researcher has taken these drawbacks into account while doing their work, secondary data analysis can be a vitally important method creating insightful research.
This report is drawn largely from data and analysis provided by the Office for National Statistics (2019, 2020a, 2020b, 2021). Alongside this, the report will draw on a variety of academic data and academic literature that will be relevant and applicable to both the downward fertility trend and the current question of a Coronavirus baby boom.
Data Analysis:
The report will now present its data analysis. First, it will look at the ways in which major events have impacted fertility. Second, it will explore changes to societal conditions that might have a relationship to declining fertility rates.
As a basis for comparison within this report, we can look at the overall declining trajectory of fertility rates between 1964 and 2019 (Figure 1), where, “the total fertility rate decreased for the seventh consecutive year” and the breakdown of this trajectory by age group (Figure 2), where, “fertility rates for women aged under 30 years have generally been decreasing since 2013.” (Office for National Statistics, 2020a).
Figure 1: Total fertility rate
Source: Office for National Statistics, 2020a
Figure 2: Age-specific fertility rates
Source: Office for National Statistics, 2020a
Specific Stressors
Although fertility rates have been on the decline for the seventh consecutive year (Office for National Statistics, 2020a), the existence of the Coronavirus pandemic has suddenly brought the future of these rates into question. While it is too early to see the impact of the first lockdown, researchers are theorising the possibility of a pandemic baby boom (The Economist, 2020) and the very first data points are beginning to be released (Moaven and Brown, 2021). Looking back on historical data from similar contexts can provide researchers with some indication of what might be to come.
Moaven and Brown (2021) have been among the first to provide data around fertility and birthrates which includes the pandemic. In an analysis of Medicare Benefits in Australia, which are regularly billed during the first prenatal exam, Moaven and Brown (2021) found that “in June 2020, the use of these item numbers increased by 25.4% and later declined to a 9.6% increase in September 2020 compared with September 2019” (Figure 3). This represents a significant change in behavior, given that pre-Covid-19, the “mean fluctuation in billing volume in the same months over different years was about 3% less or more” (Moaven and Brown, 2021). This would indicate a baby boom coming after the “first wave” of the pandemic, and provides for the possibility of further mini baby booms in conjunction with the later waves of stay at home measures.
Figure 3: Medicare Benefits services relating to 1st prenatal exam
Source: Moaven and Brown, 2021
Likewise, there is some historical evidence that events which required populations to remain at home lead to increased fertility rates. In the wake of power cuts in Canada, with large populations being required to stay at home, there was a reported mini baby boom, and an increasing demand for prenatal classes, “midwives [were] fully booked in September and October” (Ice Babies, 1998). There were similar anecdotal reports of a baby boom after Hurricane Katrina (Anonymous, 2007). This data suggests that a wave of pandemic babies could put strain on the NHS when it is already struggling to recover from the brunt of the Covid-19 pandemic. Policy will need to be implemented in order to manage this increased requirement of care.
Data from planned power outages in Columbia in 1992, provide statistical evidence for this type of baby boom. Fetzer et al (2018) found a statistically significant increase in birth rates the year after the power rationing, (shown in Figure 4, with 95% confidence intervals).
Figure 4: Effect of 1992 power rationing over time
Source: Fetzer et al, 2018
In particular, Fetzer et al (2018) found that this was only significant within the age ranges of 17-21 and 37-41 (Figure 5), indicating a main explanation for this uptick was due to inattention to contraception, either due to inexperience or presumed infertility (Fetzer et al, 2018). This could also support the slight increase in fertility rates of women over 40 seen in the age-specific data from England and Wales (Office for National Statistics, 2020a).
Figure 5: Effect of power rationing on the probability of a mother giving birth in 1993 by mother’s age group
Source: Fetzer et al, 2018
This suggests that these age ranges might be particularly useful to observe when data from the different waves of the Coronavirus pandemic is collected and analysed. If the pandemic does, in fact, lead to a boredom baby boom, inattention to contraceptives could be a reasonable explanation (Fetzer et al, 2018).
On the other hand, however, some data shows that when populations go through times of considerable stress they actually have short-term drops in fertility rates, before stabilizing (Figure 6, The Economist, 2020).
Figure 6: Birth rate, change from seasonal average
Source: The Economist, 2020
This relationship might also be found in the context of the Coronavirus pandemic, where there has been over a year of near-constant stress, which could negate any impacts a boredom baby boom might have. Research has been conducted on the impact the Ebola epidemic had on fertility levels in Liberia. McBain et al (2016) first saw a sharp decline in facility-based births after the outbreak of the Ebola virus, leading the researchers to believe there was high levels of fear surrounding entering and delivering in facilities where the virus was present, and as a result, were having their babies at home, or postponing having children all together. However, this steadily returned to near-normal levels of facility-based childbirth approximately 12 months after Liberia was declared Ebola free (Figure 7, McBain et al, 2016).
Figure 7: Facility-based childbirths during and after the Ebola epidemic
Source: McBain et al, 2016
It remains unclear as to whether or not this panic will translate to fertility in the Coronavirus pandemic. We can predict that there might be an increase in home-births compared to previous years, particularly due to the rules surrounding limited people in birthing suites (NHS, 2021). It will be imperative to create and encourage policy that allows people to again feel safe in hospitals. With both the possibility of a “boredom baby boom” and the considerations of 12 months of stress, fertility rates in the coming year, particularly post-vaccine distribution, will be a useful data source. If fertility rates rise, both during or after the pandemic, researchers might gain insight into what parts of “normal life”, which were absent during the pandemic, are hostile to having children. However, if they continue to decrease after the pandemic, researchers may be able to pinpoint the long-term effects of extreme stress levels on a national and global scale. This, too, raises policy concerns, with regards to a lack of new individuals entering into the workforce as well as the aging population (Lee et al, 2014). In the next section, both of these possibilities are explored through data on changing societal conditions and attitudes.
Societal Conditions:
There has been considerable work done over the years to try and explain the decreasing fertility rate. Qualitative work has demonstrated that women seek the continuous freedom that comes with remaining child-free, both in terms of not having someone else depend on them and in terms of being free from the expectations and judgements society places on women (Peterson, 2014); as well as showing “voluntary childlessness” as a growing and purposeful choice couples, rather than an indicator of prudishness or lack of moral character (Matthews and Desjardins, 2016). Outside of the academy and official statistics, the variety of tangible reasons a woman might choose not to have children—such as freedom, cost, and happiness in their current, childless situations—have been frequently reported in magazines (Drexler, 2019; Pawlowski, 2019).
This report takes these qualitative accounts as context in exploring the decreasing fertility rates in the UK. Whilst there are not statistical accounts directly connecting these qualitative reasons for declining rates of motherhood and the quantitative expressions of some of the burdens that come with having children, there is a direct connection between levels of sex education and teenage fertility rates (Population Matters, 2020). The Office for National Statistics reports the conception rate for women under 16 has decreased by 69.9% since 1999 (Figure 8) (Office for National Statistics, 2020b). 1999 marked the introduction of the Teenage Pregnancy Strategy for England, which placed a heavy focus on providing high quality sex and relationship education (Skinner and Marino, 2016). As such, we can hypothesise a relationship between greater and more easily accessible research into the difficulties that come with raising children and declining fertility rates, however, further statistical research should be conducted to see the degree of which this relationship is significant.
Figure 8: Conceptions in women aged 15 to 17 years
Source: Office for National Statistics, 2020b
The report will now explore some of the data about the realities of raising children, which, in conjunction with the qualitative research and evidence of education lowering fertility rates, might explain declining fertility rates in the UK.
First, we can see that there is a statistically significant relationship between parenthood and happiness. Glass et al (2016) report that the United Kingdom has the fourth largest adjusted gap in happiness between parents and non-parents: a fixed-effects regression shows that 1=happiest parents and the United Kingdom=-.87 where .P < 0.001 (Figure 9).
Figure 9: Parenthood effects from fixed-effects regression
Source: Glass et al, 2016
This level of negative correlation between parent happiness can likely be seen as one method of explaining the decreasing fertility rates in the United Kingdom.
Time and monetary stress are further factors that can likely explain decreasing fertility rates. In a longitudinal study of Australian couples, Buddelmeyer et al (2018) show that births increase time and financial stress on both mothers and fathers (Figure 10). Mothers in particular show a notable increase in time stress from one year before a child’s birth up until four years after a child’s birth (where the data ends). The study showed that women had a 32.5% increase in time stress and a 31.0% increase in financial stress after a birth (Buddelmeyer et al, 2018).
Figure 10: Time and financial stress before and after birth of a child
Source: Buddelmeyer et al, 2018
In support of this increased financial stress, it’s been shown that the cost of raising a child is a good predictor of fertility rates: “An investigation into the causes of the decline in the number of children being born finds that economic motivations are more influential [on declining fertility rates] than child mortality or social learning” (Mace, 2013). This can be further explained by three influences of financial stress.
First, the so-called parent-penalty in job seeking, where mothers face a lower proportion of call-backs than non-mothers do for job applications—approximately 3% compared to 6%, respectively (Figure 11, Correll et al, 2007), further increasing their economic stress (Buddelmeyer et al, 2018).
Figure 11: Proportions of Applicants Receiving Callbacks
Source: Correll et al, 2007
Second, the 10% increase of rental cost in the UK since January 2015 (Figure 12, Office for National Statistics, 2021), which puts strain on parents who are already facing higher economic stress (Buddelmeyer et al, 2018).
Figure 12: Private Housing Rental Prices
Source: Office for National Statistics, 2021
And Third, 63% increase of households living in the private rented sector: “from 2.8 million in 2007 to 4.5 million in 2017” (Figure 13, Office for National Statistics, 2019).
Figure 13: Households by tenure
Source: Office for National Statistics, 2019
So not only has the cost of living increased over the years, which would add to a family’s financial stress even without children, Correll et al (2007) found that “mothers experience disadvantages in workplace settings and that discrimination plays a role in producing these disadvantages,” (p 1332) meaning women might have a harder time making money to begin with. This all fits into the 31.0% increase in financial stress women face after a birth that Buddelmeyer et al (2018) found.
Summary and Conclusions:
There are an overwhelming number of variables which could explain the long-standing downward trend in fertility rates, and research will need to continue to take place in order to make sense of the data, particularly in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic. But, as this report has shown, there are a few clear directions to go whilst continuing this work.
First, due to the stay-at-home measures put into place over the course of the pandemic, and the data showing mini baby booms nine months after events which people inside for periods of time (Ice Babies, 1998; Anonymous, 2007), researchers should look out for mini baby booms approximately nine months after each of the periods of lockdown in the United Kingdom (Moaven and Brown, 2021; The Economist, 2020). This awareness and preparedness can prevent undue strain on both the NHS and on the ageing population.
However, and secondly, it is very possible that the added stress of the long term health crisis will negate or even overturn any effect the stay-at-home measures may have had. We can theorise this because of the data from both the Ebola epidemic and other wide-scale stressors, which caused a dip in fertility rates nine months after the event before leveling out by the 18-month mark (McBain et al, 2016; The Economist, 2020).
Third, further quantitative research needs to be conducted to statistically explore the impact that societal changes such as interest in freedom or happiness, increased cost of living or increased concern over the environment has on the process of family planning. Whilst current data shows many of these issues in context of those who already have children, the population of those who are choosing not to have children are being overlooked. In the past researchers have explored the way religious attitudes have changed and influenced fertility (Van Bavel and Reher, 2013), this needs to be extended as the population progresses. Hopefully the questions laid out in this report are being asked elsewhere as well, and will be taken into account as the next census enters into its development phase, and as the 2021 census is analysed.
This report has shown that these are important relationships to explore regarding fertility rates, especially as governments grapple with the combined complexities that are wrapped up in the Coronavirus pandemic.
References
1998. Ice Babies. Macleans. Toronto: St. Joseph Communications.
2020. Will the coronavirus lockdown lead to a baby boom? The Economist (Online).
ANONYMOUS 2007. New Orleans baby boom following Hurricane Katrina. Irish medical Times. Sutton: Irish Medical Times.
BRYMAN, A. 2016. Social Research Methods. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
BUDDELMEYER, H., HAMERMESH, D. & WOODEN, M. 2018. The stress cost of children on moms and dads. European Economic Review, 109, 148-161.
CASEY, G., SHAYEGH, S., MORENO-CRUZ, J., BUNZL, M., GALOR, O. & CALDEIRA, K. 2019. The impact of climate change on fertility. Environmental Research Letters, 14.
CORRELL, S., BENARD, S. & PAIK, I. 2007. Getting a Job: Is There a Motherhood Penalty? American Journal of Sociology, 112, 1297-1338.
DREXLER, P. 2019. Not All Women Want To Be Mothers: The Stigma that Surrounds Choosing Not to Have Children. Vogue. Conde Nast.
FETZER, T., PARDO, O. & SHANGHAVI, A. 2018. More than an urban legend: the short- and long- run effects of unplanned fertility shocks. Journal of Population Economics, 31, 1125-1176.
GLASS, J., SIMON, R. & ANDERSSON, M. 2016. Parenthood and Happiness: Effects of Work-Family Reconciliation Policies in 22 OECD Countries. American Journal of Sociology, 122.
JOHNSTON, M. 2014. Secondary Data Analysis: A Method of which the Time Has Come. Qualitative and Quantitative Methods in Libraries, 3, 619 –626.
LEE, R., MASON, A. & members of the NTA network. 2015. Is Low Fertility Really a Problem? Population Aging, Dependency, and Consumption. Science, 346, 229-234.
MACE, R. 2013. The cost of children. Nature.
MATTHEWS, E. & DESJARDINS, M. 2016. Remaking Our Identities: Couples’ Experiences of Voluntary Childlessness. The Family Journal, 25, 31-39.
MCBAIN, R., WICKETT, E., MUGUNGA, J. C., BESTE, J., KONWLOH, P. & MUKHERJEE, J. 2016. The post-Ebola baby boom: time to strengthen health systems. The Lancet, 388, 2331-2333.
MOAVEN, L. & BROWN, J. 2021. Covid-19 “baby boom”. Medical Journal of Australia, 214, 386-386.
NEUMAN, L. 2003. Social Research Methods. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
NHS. 2021. Pregnancy and coronavirus (COVID-19) [Online]. UK: NHS. Available: https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/coronavirus-covid-19/people-at-higher-risk/pregnancy-and-coronavirus/
OFFICE FOR NATIONAL STATISTICS. 2019. UK Private Rented Sector: 2018 [Online]. London: Office for National Statistics. Available: https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/inflationandpriceindices/articles/ukprivaterentedsector/2018
OFFICE FOR NATIONAL STATISTICS. 2020a. Births in England and Wales: 2019 [Online]. London: Office for National Statistics. Available: https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/livebirths/bulletins/birthsummarytablesenglandandwales/2019
OFFICE FOR NATIONAL STATISTICS. 2020b. Conceptions in England and Wales: 2018 [Online]. London: Office for National Statistics. Available: https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/conceptionandfertilityrates/bulletins/conceptionstatistics/2018
OFFICE FOR NATIONAL STATISTICS. 2021. Index of Private Housing Rental Prices, UK: January 2021 [Online]. London: Office for National Statistics. Available: https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/inflationandpriceindices/bulletins/indexofprivatehousingrentalprices/january2021#:~:text=Private%20rental%20prices%20paid%20by%20tenants%20in%20the%20UK%20increased,%C2%A3506.50%20in%20January%202021
PAWLOWSKI, A. 2019. Why aren’t millennials having kids? 8 insights into the child-free life [Online]. NBC Universal. Available: https://www.today.com/health/why-aren-t-millennials-having-kids-8-insights-child-free-t155804
PETERSON, H. 2015. Fifty shades of freedom. Voluntary childlessness as women’s ultimate liberation. Women’s Studies International Forum, 53, 182-191.
POPULATIONMATTERS. 2020. Can Relationships and Sex Education Help Save the Planet? [Online]. Population Matters. Available: https://populationmatters.org/news/2020/06/can-relationships-sex-education-help-save-planet
SKINNER, S. R. & MARINO, J. 2016. England’s Teenage Pregnancy Strategy: a hard-won success. The Lancet, 388, 538-540.
VAN BAVEL, J. & REHER, D. 2013. The Baby Boom and Its Causes: What We Know and What We Need to Know. Population and Development Review, 39, 257-288.